
The Role of Communication in Building Trustful Governments

MARÍA JOSÉ CANEL (<u>MJCANEL@UCM.ES</u>) LAURA ZAMORA (<u>LAURA.ZAMALV@GMAIL.COM</u>)

UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID






Public Trust in Government


How much of the time do you think you can trust government in Washington to do what is right: just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?


Trust Level (Just About Always/Most of the Time)




Source: American National Election Studies









Can communication help closing this gap?

COMMUNICATION AND INTANGIBLE ASSETS

Building intangible assets to close gaps

• Non physical asset in nature; entails profit.

- Wide variety of intangible assets: copyright, patents, intellectual capital, brand recognition, goodwill, reputation, etc.
- New concepts are created along with the development of today's knowledge economy.

Building intangible assets to close gaps

DIFFERENCE

 Private sector: increasing awareness and active discourse about the economic role and consequences of intangible assets (Lev & Daum, 2004)

• *Public sector:* **apprehensive** about intangible assets (Cinca et al., 2003)-

PARADOX

- Intangibility is even more important in public than in profit-making organizations (Cinca *et al.*, 2003; Bossi, Fuertes & Serrano, 2005):
 - o non-monetary aims;
 - intangible resources (knowledge and human resources);
 - intangible outcomes: public services

Building intangible assets in the public sector, an emerging research area

(Garnett, 1992; Grunig, 1997; Garnett et al., 2008; Glenny, 2008; Luoma-aho, 2008; Geldes & Ihlen, 2010; Stromback and Kiousis, 2011; Canel & Sanders, 2012; Waeraas & Byrkjeflot, 2012; Valentini, 2013; Sanders & Canel, 2013; Luoma-aho and Makikangas, 2013).



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Exploring TRUST

RELATION WITH CITIZENS' EXPERIENCES:

HOW PEOPLE REFER THEIR TRUST IN THE PRIME MINISTER TO REAL GOVERNMENT'S ACHIEVEMENTS, THAT THEY EXPERIENCE?

Debate about the "Electoral Cycle"

□ Electoral cycle in citizens' assessments of governments.

□ Therefore, **trust is independent** from what the government **does in fact** (its performance with its achievements and failures); and also independent from **environmental conditions**.

BUT trust assessment is related to real events and conditions, and responds to environmental change (Mueller, 1970 and 1973; Kernell, 1978).

> Trust is not only inertial but also experiential

Looking for causes of (dis)trust

- *Inertial*: Party variables/SES variables (Edwards III, 1976; Kernell, 1986; Ostrom y Simon, 1987; Gronke, 1999; Chanley et al., 2000)
- *Experiential*: Assessments about the situation/Government performance (Edwards III, 1976 y 1983; Rose, 1991; Lanoue y Headrick, 1994; Rimmerman, 1991).



Research question:

- ➢ How much experiential versus inertial is trust in the Prime Minister in Spain? Do experiences matter?
- > Does the economic crisis make a difference?
- >What are the implications for government communication in times of economic crisis?



Methodology: DV

DEPENDENT VARIABLE:

≻How much do you trust the PM?

(Ostrom & Simon, 1988; Gronke, 1999; Hudson, 1987; Lanoue & Headrick, 1994; Kernell, 1978; Key & Fiorina, 1981; Citrin & Green, 1986; Marsh, Ward & Sanders, 1991; Sanders. 1991 & 1993; Chanley et al.. 2000; Bosch & Riba 2005; McGraw & Ling. 2003; Shaw et al.. 2002)




Methødology: IV

□ Inertial variables: Party identification and SES

□ Experiential variables: Variables related to perceptions on the environmental conditions: government performance, economic and political situation (Kernell, 1978; Key & Fiorina, 1981; Citrin & Green, 1986; Marsh, Ward & Sanders, 1991; Sanders, 1991 and 1993; Chanley et al., 2000; Bosch & Riba, 2005). Prospective and retrospective

Hypothesis

- H1. Inertial variables explain trust in the PM.
- H2. Experiential variables also help explaining trust in the PM.
- H3. Since trust has a temporal dimension, retrospective and prospective assessments have an effect on trust.
- H4. Across time, inertial variables tend to explain less than expriential variables.





Evidence does not support the "cycle theory"

Findings: 3rd year for each term since 1993

MODEL	March 1995		April 1999		Octobe	October 2003		October 2007		r 2010	January 2014		
CHARACTERISTICS Corrected R2	.57		.62	60		.72		.62		3	.59		
Statistical significance	.000		.000		.00		.000		.50		.000		
Durbin-Watson	1.94		1.94		2.0	-	.00	0	1.9		2.03		
COEFFICIENTS	N.S	S	N. S.	S	N. S.	2 S.	N. S.	S.	N. S.	5 S.	N. S.	5 S.	
Inertial variables													
Party ID (vote recall)	.5 *	.25 ***	.5 *	.2 ***	.34	.2 ***	.5 *	.24 ***	.4 *	.2 ***	.35 *	.21 ***	
Age	.004 **	.07 ***	.006	.1 ***	.002 **	.04 *	.002	.04 *	.002 **	.04	.002	.05 **	
Gender (woman)	01		02		02 *		04 *		.04 *		03		
				Ex	periential v	/ariables							
Government Performance	.45 *	.46 ***	.45 *	.45 ***	.5 *	.5 ***	.4 *	.4 ***	.53 *	.57 ***	.38 *	.5 ***	
Political Situation	.08 *	.08 ***	.16 *	.15 **	.12	.13 ***	.13 *	.13 ***	.1 *	.12 ***	.09 *	.1 ***	
Economic Situation	.07	.06 **	.5 *	.04	.04 *		.04 *	.04 *	.02 *		.09 *	.08 ***	
Retrospective PS			.02 *		.02		.1 *	.05 **	.001 *		.03		
Prospective PS			.08 *	.05	003 *		03 *		.08 *	.06 **	007 *		
Retrospective ES			.02		.02		02 *		.007 *		.02		
Prospective ES	.12	.09 ***	.05 *		.06 *	.05 **	.05 *		034 *		.06 *	06 **	

Regression models characteristics

MODEL CHARACTERI STICS	March 1995	April 1999	October 2003	October 2007	October 2010	January 2014
Corrected R2	.57	.62	.72	.62	.56	.59
Statistical significance	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Durbin-Watson	1.94	1.94	2.02	2	1.93	2.03

•For all years regressions **explain more than half of the variance**

•All regressions are **highly statistically significant** (0.000)

•Values for Durbin-Watson allow assuming that the principle of **independence amongst variables holds**

Results

	March		Apr	il	Octo	ber	October		October		Janu	ary	
	1995	5	199	9	200	03	200	07	2010		2014		
COEFFICIE NTS	N.S	S	N. S.	S	N. S.	S.	N. S.	S.	N. S.	S.	N. S.	S.	
Inertial variables													
Party ID (vote recall)	•5 *	.25 ***	•5 *	.2 ***	•5 *	.2 4 ***	•4 *	.2 ***	•34 *	.2 ***	•35 *	.21 ***	
Age	.004 **	.07 ***	.006 **	.1 ***	.002 **	.04 *	.002 **	.04 *	.002 **	.04 *	.002 **	.05 **	
Gender (woman)	01 *		02 *		02 *		04 *		.04 *		03		
			Ex	peri	ential	vari	ables						
Government Performance	•45 *	.46 ***	•45 *	•45 ***	•4 *	•4 ***	•53 *	•57 ***	•5 *	•5 ***	.38 *	•5 ***	
Political Situation	.08 *	.08 ***	.16 *	.15 **	.12 *	.13 ***	.13 *	.13 ***	.1 *	.12 ***	.09 *	.1 ***	
Economic Situation	.07 *	.06 **	•5 *	.04 *	.04 *		.04 *	.04 *	.02 *		.09 *	.08 ***	

Hypothesis 1


	March		h April		October		October		October		January			
	1995		1999		2003		2007		2010		2014			
COEFFICIE	N.S	S	N. S.	S	N. S.	S.								
NTS														
Inertial variables														
Party ID (vote	.5	.25	.5	.2	.5	.24	.4	.2	.34	.2	.35	.21		
recall)	*	***	*	***	*	***	*	***	*	***	*	***		
Age	.004	.07	.006	.1	.002	.04	.002	.04	.002	.04	.002	.05		
Ū.	**	***	**	***	**	*	**	*	**	*	**	**		
Gender	01		02		02		04		.04		03			
(woman)	*		*		*		*		*					

Party identification explains. SES don't explain much.

Hypothesis 2

	March		April		October		October		October		January		
	1995	5	199	9	200	003 2007)7 20		10	2014		
COEFFICIE	N.S	S	N. S.	S	N. S.	S.	N. S.	S.	N. S.	S.	N. S.	S.	
NTS													
Experiential variables													
Government	•45	.46	•45	.45	.4	.4	.53	•57	•5	.5	.38	•5	
Performance	*	***	*	***	*	***	*	***	*	***	*	***	
Political	.08	.08	.16	.15	.12	.13	.13	.13	.1	.12	.09	.1	
Situation (PS)	*	***	*	**	*	***	*	***	*	***	*	***	
Economic	.07	.06	.5	.04	.04		.04	.04	.02		.09	.08	
Situation (ES)	*	**	*	*	*		*	*	*		*	***	

Government performance explains. PS and ES also explain, though less *Experiences matter*



Government performance explains even more than party identification (standardized coefficients).


Experiences matter

Hypothesis 3

- Hypothesis 3 does not hold
- There is no relation between retrospective and prospective variables and trust in the PM.

Past and	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
future										

Hypothesis 4



 The closer the economic crisis, the more citizens refer trust in the PM to his performance, independently from political preferences

2) However, in the aftermath of tough meassures, ...

Non-standardized regression coefficients

...there are other elements that might be starting to matter

Conclusions

Conclusions

• The economic crisis is modifying the way people assess trust in the PM:

- × It is becoming more experiential than inertial
- × Experiences matter: people tend to care more about public policies results


Conclusions

• BUT 2014 show a more confused landscape:

> Both government performance and party ID explain less than before

> Other sources for (dis)trust should be looked for:

Might corruption scandals have an effect?
Might he way government perform appart from real achievements also matter?



Implications for government communication

- 1. To track public opinion for a continuos gaps calibration
- 2. To prioritize communication of public policies: outcomes, structures, leaders and processes?
- 3. To avoid partisan messages: institutional arrangements
- 4. To go from tactic to strategic approaches to build intangible assets
- 5. To strengthen links with citizens



Thank you!